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Chapter 5
How Much Choice is Too Much?
Contributions to 401(k)
Retirement Plans
Sheena Sethi-Iyengar, Gur Huberman, and Wei Jiang
It is commonly supposed that the more choices we have, the better off
we are—that the human ability to manage and the desire for choice are
infinite. From classic economic theories of free enterprise, to mundane
marketing practices that offer aisles of potato chips and soft drinks, the
desire for infinite choice pervades our institutions, norms, and customs. Ice
cream parlors compete to offer the most flavors while major fast-food chains
urge customers to “Have it your way.” Furthermore, the challenges of choice
are not merely confined to snack foods. With today’s plethora of retirement
savings plans, important life decisions have also become a matter of choice,
where employees become consumers, contemplating alternative career
options and multiple investment opportunities.
These days, most workers cannot expect to retire on Social Security alone;
therefore people are increasingly turning to company pension plans to help
them save for retirement. Firms offer 401(k) plans in order to attract new
employees, encourage superior performances from current employees, and
increase employee retention. The 401(k) plan, named for section 401(k) of
the Internal Revenue Code, permits employees of qualifying companies to set
aside tax-deferred funds with each paycheck. While the employer is responsi-
ble for establishing a 401(k) plan, employees must decide what percentage of
their paycheck will be deducted for their plans. Employees can legally con-
tribute up to 25 percent of their annual earnings as long as the amount does
not exceed the legal cap (which was $12,000 in 2003). Over the past decade
the number of employer-provided retirement plans has skyrocketed from
under 100,000 in 1990, to over 400,000 by 2002.
While the promise of a greater variety of plans seems beneficial, is there
such a thing as too much choice? Indeed, if we look beyond the number
of plans available, and we examine the options within the plans themselves,
The authors acknowledge the contributions of Steve Utkus, who made available the data essen-
tial for conducting this analysis and provided the authors constructive feedback throughout the
process. The authors would also like to thank Gary Mottola for his considerable time and effort.
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we find even more decisions waiting to be made. Most 401(k) plans offer
employees a myriad of investment opportunities from mutual funds, insur-
ance companies, and/or banks. Indeed, some providers even allow employ-
ees to invest in individual stocks, and on global capital exchanges allowing
for maximum portfolio diversification. But, does bigger necessarily mean
better? When large companies woo potential employees with a smorgasbord
of options, do these options actually enhance employee welfare?
Inherent to consumerism is the assumption that choice is both desirable
and powerful. Psychological theory and research have similarly presumed
that choice is invariably beneficial. Repeatedly, across many domains of
inquiry, psychologists have contended that the provision of choice can
increase the individual’s sense of personal control (e.g. Rotter, 1966;
Taylor and Brown, 1988; Taylor, 1989) and feelings of intrinsic motivation
(e.g. deCharms, 1968; Deci, 1981; Deci and Ryan, 1985). In turn, personal
control and intrinsic motivation have been correlated with numerous physical
and psychological benefits, including greater task enjoyment, enhanced task
performance, and increased life satisfaction. Indeed, even seemingly trivial or
wholly illusory choices have been shown to have powerful motivating con-
sequences (e.g. Langer, 1975; Langer and Rodin, 1976; Dember et al., 1992).
More recently, however, a few researchers have demonstrated potential
limitations to this assumption. Rather than presuming the benefits of
choice to be ubiquitous, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) examined the con-
sequences of offering choosers an extensive range of alternatives, in which
the differences among options were relatively small. They hypothesized
that choosers will be intrinsically motivated by the actual provision of
extensive choices, because such contexts allow for maximal opportunity in
the achievement of personal preference matching. Nonetheless, the very
act of making a choice from an excessive number of options might result in
“choice overload,” in turn lessening both the motivation to choose and the
subsequent motivation to commit to a choice.
Field and laboratory experiments were conducted in which the intrinsic
motivations of participants encountering limited as opposed to extensive
choices were compared (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000). In one compelling
field demonstration, a tasting booth for exotic jams was arranged at
Draeger’s, a California gourmet grocery store. This grocery store is of particu-
lar interest because its salient distinguishing feature is the extraordinary
selection it offers, especially when compared with large grocery chains.
For instance, Draeger’s offers roughly 250 different varieties of mustard,
75 different varieties of olive oil, and over 300 varieties of jam. Shoppers
are frequently offered sample tastes of this enormous array of available
products; consequently, Draeger’s provided a particularly conducive envir-
onment for a naturalistic experiment, using tasting booths.
As customers passed the tasting booth, they encountered a display with
either 6 or 24 different flavored jams. The number of passers-by who
approached the tasting booth and the number of purchases made in these
84 Sethi-Iyengar et al.
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two conditions served as dependent variables. The results indicated that
although extensive choice proved initially more enticing than limited
choice, limited choice was ultimately more motivating. Thus, 60 percent
of the passers-by approached the table in the extensive-choice condition
as compared to only 40 percent in the limited-choice condition. However,
as depicted in Figure 5-1, 30 percent of the customers who encountered
the limited selection actually purchased a jam, while only 3 percent of
those offered the extensive selection made a purchase.
This study’s results challenge a fundamental assumption underlying
classic psychological theories of human motivation and economic theories of
rational choice; that is, that having more choice is necessarily more desirable
and intrinsically motivating. These findings from this study show that an
extensive array of options can at first seem highly appealing to consumers,
yet it also can reduce subsequent motivation to purchase the product. Even
though consumers presumably shop at this particular store in part because
of the large number of selections available, having “too much” choice seems,
nonetheless, to have hampered their later motivation to buy.
Subsequent laboratory experiments not only support the “choice over-
load” hypothesis, but they also provide insight into the potential mediators
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Figure 5-1. Comparison of jam sampling versus purchasing in limited and extensive-
choice conditions.
Note : White bars: Percentage of passers-by who approached the tasting booth; Solid bars:
Percentage of “approachers” who subsequently purchased jam.
Source : Iyengar and Lepper (2000).
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of this hypothesis (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000). In one experiment, this
time involving displays of Godiva chocolate, participants once again
encountered either a limited or an extensive array of option, and were
asked to make a choice. Unlike the jam study, however, before being given
the opportunity to sample the selection they had made, choosers’ expecta-
tions about their choices were assessed. Participants provided predictions
about how satisfied they would be with their stated preference—whether
they expected the choice they made to be merely “satisfactory,” or “among
the best.” After making their choices, participants were asked to provide
ratings of their enjoyment, difficulty, and frustration during the choice-
making process. Later, after sampling their choices, they again provided
ratings of satisfaction and regret.
Study participants either sampled a chosen Godiva chocolate from a
limited selection of six, or an extensive selection of 30. At the time they
made their choices, participants reported enjoying the process more when
choosing from the display of 30 chocolates as opposed to the display of six.
Subsequently, however, participants choosing from the selection of six
proved more satisfied and more likely to purchase chocolates again, as
compared to participants choosing from a selection of 30. Collectively, these
results suggest that choosers may experience frustration with complex choice-
making processes, and that dissatisfaction with their choices—stemming from
greater feelings of responsibility for the choices they make—may lead to
a lower willingness to commit to one choice.
It is not that people are saddened by the decisions they make in the face
of abundant options, but rather that they are rendered unsure, burdened by
the responsibility of choosing optimally. In theory, the burden of choosing
experienced by choosers in these studies should have been insignificant,
since the task of choosing among chocolates or jams is less about distin-
guishing between “right” and “wrong” choices and more about the identi-
fication of personal preferences. Nevertheless, the findings demonstrate that
the offer of overly extensive choices in relatively less consequential choice-
making contexts can have significant demotivating effects. Participants in
both the jam and chocolates studies proved less likely to buy these products
when confronted with an overwhelming array of choices.
Perhaps the phenomenon of choice overload may be further exacerbated
by contexts in which (i) the costs associated with making the “wrong”
choice, or even beliefs that there are truly “wrong” choices, are much more
prominent; and/or (ii) substantial time and effort would be required for
choosers to make truly informed comparisons among alternatives. The
more choosers perceive their choice-making task to necessitate expert
information, the more they may be inclined not to choose. In such cases,
in fact, they may even surrender the choice to someone else—whom they
presumably see as more expert (de Charms, 1968; Langer and Rodin, 1976;
Schulz, 1976; Zuckerman et al., 1978; Lepper, 1983; Deci and Ryan, 1985;
Malone and Lepper, 1987; Taylor, 1989). In Schwartz’s (1994) terms, one
86 Sethi-Iyengar et al.
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important paradox confronting the modern world is that as the freedom of
individuals expands, so too does people’s dependence on institutions and
on other people.
The Effect of Choice Overload on 401(k) 
Plan Contributions
Given that the choice overload phenomenon was observed in less con-
sequential choice-making contexts (i.e. when choosing jams and chocolates),
to what extent might it also hold for major life decisionmaking situations?
To test its presence in more consequential decisionmaking, we examined
employees’ decisions about whether—and how much—to participate in
the 401(k) retirement benefit plan offered to them by their employers.
The ramifications of employee investment decisions are potentially life-
changing. Contributions to the 401(k) protect employees’ income from
being taxed, thus allowing employees to save more for their retirement.
Moreover, employers often match employee contributions to the 401(k).
One might have predicted participation rates to be at an all-time high, given
the plethora of options available to employees and the ease with which
many employees can transfer funds using the Internet. In fact, from 1998 to
2001, the average 401(k) plan has boosted its available investment options
by 21 percent (Mottola and Utkus, 2003).
A Hewitt Associates survey as cited in The Washington Post shows that
participation in 401(k) plans dropped to 68.2 percent of workers at the
end of 2002, from 71 percent a year earlier (Washington Post, 2003).
Additionally, the average 401(k) participant contributes less than 7 percent
of pre-tax salary, even though financial advisors encourage a contribution
of 10 percent or more of pre-tax salary (Financial Planning Association,
2002). Why are participation rates so low, despite an ever-increasing array
of plan offerings? Could it be that the provision of more 401(k) plan
options does not have a positive effect on employee willingness to particip-
ate in a plan? Instead, does the consequentiality of the investment decision,
combined with employee intimidation by the complex details of the various
plan offerings, contribute to a pronounced choice overload effect, resulting
in a greater likelihood of investors choosing not to choose?
We test this hypothesis by examining 401(k) participation rates among
clients of the Vanguard Group, an investment management company. The
firm provided records of contributions to 401(k) plans at both the plan and
individual levels for the year 2001. We identified employees as participants
in the 401(k) plans if they contributed any part of their salary to the plan.
We made no distinctions among participants based on the amount they
contributed as long as it was above $0. Those employees who chose not
to contribute any part of their salary to a 401(k) were designated non-
participants. The sample included 926,104 records for 899,631 employees of
647 plans in 69 industries. We excluded any employee hired after January 1,
5 / How Much Choice is Too Much? 87
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2001 (10 percent), who was less than 18 years old (0.02 percent), or whose
annual salary was less than $10,000 or above $1,000,000 (7.51 percent), leav-
ing an analysis group of 793,794 people. The records identified 442,544 of
these people as male and 264,471 as female, and the mean age was 43. The
mean and median salaries were $61,150 and $47,430, respectively. Over
71 percent of the employees contributed positive amounts to tax-deferred
accounts in 2001, and 75 percent of the accounts had positive balances in
tax-deferred accounts. The savings rate was 5.2 percent, and 12.2 percent of
401(k) participants contributed the maximum amount in 2001 (which was
an annual limit of $10,500).
We analyzed how individual and plan characteristics affect individual
participation, and in particular, whether more funds offered correlated
negatively with participation rates. The empirical regression examined the
effect of the number of offered funds (which ranged from 2 to 59) on the
employee likelihood of participating in the 401(k) plan.1 Our regressions
controlled for both employee and plan-level characteristics.2 Employee-
level data is particularly important because it is generally inappropriate to
estimate a relation on an aggregate level and then infer that an analogous
relation holds at the individual level. For example, our data shows that at
plan level, a $10,000 increase in average compensation, everything else
equal, would increase average contribution by $480, while at the individual
level, the same coefficient is $907. In some cases, even the sign of certain
factors could be reversed (C.F., 2001).
The regressions, controlled for several employee attributes: Annual
compensation in $10,000 (COMP); gender (FEMALE); age in years (AGE);
the wealth rank (1–24) of the nine-digit zip code neighborhood where the
individual lives, WEALTH);3 and the length (in years) of the individual’s
tenure with the current employer. Plan-level attributes for which we con-
trolled were average compensation in $10,000 (COMP_MEAN), average
age (AGE_MEAN), average tenure (TENURE_MEAN), average wealth rank
(WEALTH_MEAN), number of employees in natural logo (NEMPLOY),
the rate of web registration among participants in the plan in percentage
points (WEB), a variable indicating whether the plan allowed individuals
to take loans out of their tax-deferred savings. Some 541 plans covering 
88 percent of the employees offered loans, and about 17 percent of those
employees had a positive loan balance at the end of 2001, with a median
loan balance of $4,373. Also controlled was the rate (in percentage points)
at which employers matched employee contributions (MATCH); and a vari-
able indicating whether the company’s own stock was offered. There were
125 plans covering 59 percent of the employees in this population who were
offered company-owned stock (COMPSTK). Most importantly, the number
of funds offered (NFUNDS) was a key regressor.
As shown in Table 5-1, if a plan offered more funds, this depressed prob-
ability of employee 401(k) participation. Other things equal, every ten funds
88 Sethi-Iyengar et al.
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TABLE 5-1 Determinants of Individual Participation in DC Plans (2001) (DepVar: Plan Participation rate, %)
Linear Probability Probit
Pooled Regressions Within–Between Log-Linear Linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Marginal Marginal
COEF t COEF t COEF t COEF t COEF t Pr COEF t Pr
CNST 197.44 6.13 216.88 6.26 206.39 5.73 278.13 6.22 845.14 114.88 — 172.37 41.23 —
I. Individual 
characteristics
COMP 15.12 0.162 22.19 0.190 15.00 0.175 15.19 0.101 57.00 0.406 15.31 7.84 0.068 2.54
FEMALE 5.73 0.406 7.74 0.809 4.35 0.879 6.12 0.108 19.57 0.401 5.26 17.60 0.375 5.71
AGE 0.47 0.078 0.38 0.091 0.39 0.123 0.47 0.048 1.10 0.132 0.29 2.09 0.124 0.68
AGE2 0.01 0.002 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.001 0.01 0.001 0.00 0.02 0.001 0.01
WEALTH 5.96 0.049 — — 5.91 0.064 5.91 0.034 23.29 0.142 6.25 2.9 0.056 0.94
TENURE 1.28 0.080 1.32 0.101 1.17 0.132 1.22 0.045 4.63 0.067 1.24 5.10 0.063 1.65
TENURE2 0.03 0.002 0.03 0.003 0.03 0.005 0.03 0.001 0.11 0.002 0.03 0.12 0.002 0.04
II. Plan policy 
variables
LOANS 3.69 3.765 2.67 44.500 — — 1.02 3.778 12.9 0.639 3.46 4.58 0.607 1.49
MATCH 0.18 0.015 0.18 0.015 — — 0.18 0.017 0.68 0.007 0.18 0.59 0.006 0.19
COMPSTK 2.89 1.338 2.94 1.598 — — 3.11 1.139 6.46 0.423 1.74 7.45 0.406 2.42
NFUNDS 0.2 0.083 0.17 0.058 — — 0.21 0.077 0.61 0.037 0.16 0.57 0.034 0.19
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TABLE 5.1 Continued.
Linear Probability Probit
Pooled Regressions Within–Between Log-Linear Linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Marginal Marginal
COEF t COEF t COEF t COEF t COEF t Pr COEF t Pr
III. Plan-level 
controls
COMP_MEAN 1.09 3.759 0.72 1.014 3.75 4.808 3.20 5.000 10.63 0.756 2.86 2.35 0.123 0.76
WEALTH_MEAN 0.69 2.300 — — 0.90 2.903 0.69 2.654 4.88 0.424 1.31 3.98 0.219 1.29
AGE_MEAN 1.47 0.274 1.55 0.463 1.04 0.486 1.31 0.376 4.41 0.096 1.18 4.36 0.088 1.41
TENURE_MEAN 1.06 0.275 1.20 0.423 0.82 0.371 1.08 0.282 3.52 0.074 0.95 3.64 0.069 1.18
WEB 0.07 0.063 0.14 0.059 0.17 0.063 0.14 0.059 0.29 0.022 0.08 0.71 0.019 0.23
NEMPLOYEES 2.88 0.331 3.29 0.593 3.37 0.832 3.73 0.789 9.23 0.119 2.48 10.82 0.110 3.51
R2 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.33 0.12 0.23
Note : The all-sample participation rate is 70.8%. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Columns (1)–(4) are results from a linear probability model. COMP
and WEALTH are expressed in dollars. The standard errors are obtained by bootstraps (50 replications) that adjust for both heteroskedasticity (both within
and across groups, and group-specific disturbances) and within group correlation (due to the group-specific disturbance). Columns (5) and (6) report results
from probit estimation. Pseudo R2 and incremental probability of correct prediction are reported for goodness-of-fit. Marginal probabilities are calculated by
setting all non-dummy variables at their mean values, and all dummy variables at zero. In column (6), COMP is expressed in $10,000, and WEALTH is
expressed in IXI ranks from 1 to 24. The number of observations is 793,794.
Source : Authors’ computations.
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5 / How Much Choice is Too Much? 91
added was associated with 1.5 percent to 2 percent drop in participation rate.
Figure 5-2 illustrates the decline of participation rates as a function of num-
ber of funds offered, controlling for all other variables listed in Table 5-1 (by
setting them at their mean values). If there were only two funds offered,
participation rates peaked at 75 percent, but when there were 59 funds
offered, participation rates dipped to a low of approximately 60 percent.
The majority of the plans included in this data set offered between 10 and
30 options, yet Figure 5-2 shows that plans offering (fewer than 10 plans) had
significantly higher employee participation rates. Although the number of
plans that offered between 30 and 60 options was few, there is a distinctive
trend, which suggests that the decline in participation rates is exacerbated
as offerings increased further.
While other researchers have considered some of the issues covered here,
our results are particularly compelling because of the size and nature of the
data used, namely actual employee records (including non-participants’
records) from hundreds of 401(k) plans. Our findings have important
implications for sponsors designing investment menus for 401(k) plans, as
well as for policymakers considering private accounts within Social Security.
Figure 5-2. The relation between participation and number of funds offered.
Notes : The graph plots the relation between the plan participation rate. Explanatory variables
except the number of funds offered are set at their respective mean values and the number of
funds offered using a two-stage parametric estimation method. The dotted lines represent the
95% confidence intervals.
Source : Authors’ analyses.
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Both sponsors and policymakers may intuitively feel that limiting the num-
ber of options to a manageable few is desirable based on considerations
such as the demographics of participants/employees, their investment
knowledge or experience, and the complexity of investment decisionmaking
generally or from the options themselves. Our research provides a quant-
itative basis for this intuition.
Recently, there has also been a trend to offer “fund windows” or “broker-
age accounts,” in which employees are offered hundreds or thousands of
securities. A fund window is an investment structure that significantly
expands 401(k) plan investment choices by allowing participants to choose
from funds beyond their main investment options. Although record-keeping
for assets in the fund window is usually performed on the same system as the
main 401(k) investments, the funds in the window are considered distinct
from the main options (Hewitt Associates, 2001). With brokerage accounts,
employees are permitted to trade virtually any US stock, bond, or mutual
fund; the problem, of course, is if they are not informed, they run the risk of
investing rashly.
Plan providers who continue to present participants with a plethora of
options including brokerage accounts and fund windows might perhaps
consider “tiering” the options. This could include focusing communication
activities on a core set of investment options, with more limited information
about the larger number of choices (or perhaps just a reference to where
the information can be found—for example, a website). As an example, a
plan could offer two tiers of investments including ten main funds in Tier I,
and 60 in the fund window in Tier II. Another possibility, rather than offer-
ing a menu of 100 or 1,000 options, is to present participants with a menu of
10 options plus one—with the last being “many more choices.”
Pension fiduciary law requires the plan sponsor to investigate fund
options, provide manageable choices to employees, and offer educational
programs through which employees can verse themselves in their options.
Yet, often employees fail to avail themselves of the necessary information.
Industry evidence indicates that half of all these participants never contact
their money managers in any given year, and those who do tend to be afflu-
ent, higher-balance participants. Perhaps in attempting to provide employees
with a generous number of 401(k) options, employers may actually intimi-
date rather than induce employees to invest in personal retirement plans.
One way to combat the dangers of choice overload in which employees
“choose not to choose,” is to implement for “libertarian paternalism,”
a phrase recently coined to describe institutional efforts to affect individuals’
behavior while respecting their freedom of choice. Sunstein and Thaler
(2003) who develop this notion, propose that people’s preferences often
are ill-informed, which leads to decisions, that are unduly influenced by
default rules, framing effects, and starting points (Sunstein and Thaler,
2003). An employer aware of such issues could react by steering employee
92 Sethi-Iyengar et al.
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choices in a welfare-promoting direction, yet without eliminating their
freedom of choice. In the present case, the libertarian paternalist employer
would design the plan carefully so as not to offer too much choice to
employees. In order to ensure that employees engage in some form of
retirement savings, the employer might declare a “standard” or default
401(k) plan into which workers are automatically enrolled, if they do not
elect to opt out. While this is currently permitted by US pension regula-
tion, but it may actually be dictated by the tenets of libertarian paternalism.
Notes
1 Strictly speaking, we lack data on the total number of funds offered by each plan,
so we approximate it by counting the number of funds used by at least one parti-
cipant in each plan. As a result, the number of funds offered could be under esti-
mated for plans with few employees and/or with low participation ratios. Given that
the average plan in our sample had 1,486 employees, the measurement error
should be minimal. If a bias arises from this approximation, it will bias against find-
ing a demotivating effect of more choices.
2 Specifically the following empirical equation was estimated:
Here, yij* is the desired contribution made by individual i in plan j. yij is the observed
contribution which is doubly censored at and . There are three sets
of regressors. Xij is a set of individual characteristics variables; represents the
plan-level averages of individual characteristics; and Zj is a set of plan policy vari-
ables. The disturbance can be decomposed into a plan-specific error, j, assumed
uncorrelated across difference plans, and an individual disturbance, ij, which is
independently distributed across individuals. Both j and ij could be heteroskedas-
tic across different plans and/or individuals, but are assumed to be independent
of the regressors. From an economic analysis perspective, the meaningful contri-
bution is the “desired contribution,” and not necessarily the observed one. For
example, if next year the 401(k) contribution cap is raised from $12,000 to $15,000,
those who are currently contributing $12,000 would likely contribute more because
their desired contribution is greater than the observed level. Personal and plan
attributes both determine desired contribution, but the latter is only partially
observed.
3 A company called IXI collects retail and IRA asset data from most of the large
financial services companies, Vanguard being one of them. IXI then aggregates the
data from all the companies at the Zip4 level. IXI divides the total of retail and
IRA assets in each Zip4 by the number of households (based on US Census data)
to determine the average assets for each Zip4. This enables IXI to assign a code
(from 1 to 24) at the Zip4 level which indicates about how much money in
investable assets people living in each particular Zip4 have. A Zip4 has, on
Xj
v  10,500v  0
yij   v,v,yij*,
if  yij* 
  
 
v
if  yij*    v
otherwise
.
yij
*
  01Xij2Xj3Zj  jij,
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average, about 10–12 houses in it. So, the IXI system works under the premise that
peoples’ financial situation is similar to that of their immediate neighbors, which is
a reasonable premise. Further, using the wealth level of the neighborhood, instead
using that of the individual under consideration, eliminates spurious correlation
between current contribution and accumulated wealth. The term “wealth” used
here includes bank, brokerage, and mutual fund investment assets.
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